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Introduction		My	aim	here	is	to	question	some	of	the	details	of	Nanay’s	discussion,	trying	to	keep	an	eye	on	how	apparently	small	problems	might	make	a	big	difference	to	the	ambitious	aims	of	his	book.		I'll	focus	on	his	discussion	of	aesthetically	relevant	properties	and	on	his	theme	of	how	the	philosophy	of	perception	can	reconfigure	debates	in	aesthetics.							
1.	Aesthetically	Relevant	Properties	and	the	Fate	of	Formalism		Nanay	recommends	that	we	reframe	many	debates	about	aesthetic	properties	as	debates	about	"aesthetically	relevant	properties".		But	I	don't	think	that	Nanay	has	adequately	pinned	down	his	new	notion,	and	in	any	case,	insofar	as	he	has	pinned	it	down,	I	don't	think	it	can	do	what	he	wants	it	to	do.		According	to	Nanay,	the	aesthetically	relevant	properties	of	an	object	are	those	such	that	attending	to	them	makes	an	aesthetic	difference	(67,	71).		For	example,	if	attending	to	a	work's	property	of	being	made	of	a	certain	material	makes	an	aesthetic	difference,	then	being	made	of	that	material	will	be	an	aesthetically	relevant	property	of	a	work.				First,	a	comment:	while	it	is	tempting	to	think	only	about	which	properties	OF	an	artwork	are	aesthetically	relevant,	I	suspect	it	is	better	to	think	about	which	properties	are	aesthetically	relevant	FOR	an	artwork.		Think	about	when	an	artwork	essentially	involves	an	illusion,	perhaps	as	when	the	cut	of	Lucio	Fontana	slash	painting	is	backed	with	dark	gauze,	creating	an	inaccurate	visual	impression	of	a	dark	spatial	expanse	behind	the	canvas.		To	appreciate	such	a	work,	it	might	be	essential	that	you	attend	to	a	property	the	illusion	gets	your	perception	to	
misattribute	to	the	work	(or	elsewhere).				Second,	Nanay's	gloss	is	only	as	helpful	as	the	notion	of	an	"aesthetic	difference"	it	uses,	but	we	need	a	better	grip	on	the	latter.		Here	is	Nanay's	start:		 if	attending	to	a	property	of	a	particular	changes	the	valence	of	one’s	experience	of	that	particular,	it	is	an	aesthetically	relevant	property...	if	attending	to	P	makes	me	appreciate	my	experience	more	(or	less),	P	is	an	aesthetically	relevant	property	(72-73).																																																										
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I	don’t	think	this	works.		The	suggestion	certainly	doesn't	fit	with	the	examples	Nanay	gives	elsewhere:		 aesthetically	relevant	properties	may	alter	our	general	aesthetic	evaluations	of	the	artwork,	strengthen	or	weaken	our	identification	with	a	fictional	character,	trigger	an	aesthetic	experience	of	a	Prussian	[sic]	nature,	make	us	appreciate	a	narrative	twist,	and	so	on	(67).		In	many	of	these	cases,	attending	to	an	aesthetically	relevant	property	needn’t	go	along	with	a	difference	in	appreciation	of	our	own	experience.		For	example,	I	might	come	to	identify	with	a	character	just	a	little	bit	less,	or	increase	my	understanding	of	a	narrative	a	little	bit	more,	without	this	affecting	how	much	I	appreciate	my	own	experience.		In	such	cases,	we	have	aesthetically	relevant	properties	that	do	not	make	an	aesthetic	difference	in	the	suggested	sense.			There	are	also	many	cases	of	making	an	aesthetic	difference	in	Nanay's	suggested	sense	that	do	not	go	along	with	aesthetically	relevant	properties.		Consider	how	our	various	pet	peeves	and	pet	predilections	can	affect	our	engagement	with	art.		For	example,	when	a	doting	father	looks	at	a	painting	made	by	his	daughter,	and	attends	to	its	property	of	having	been	made	by	his	daughter,	his	appreciation	of	his	experience	of	her	work	might	go	up.		But	this	would	not	enough	to	make	the	property	of	being	made	by	his	daughter	an	aesthetically	relevant	property	in	any	useful	sense.			We	seem	to	need	something	quite	different	from	Nanay's	current	gloss	of	"aesthetic	difference".		I	leave	open	how	he	might	proceed.				I'll	now	assess	whether	aesthetically	relevant	properties	can	play	the	roles	they	are	meant	to	play,	given	the	way	Nanay	has	introduced	them.		According	to	his	chapter	5,	we	can	use	them	to	formulate	and	adjudicate	debates	about	the	range	of	properties	that	matter	for	the	evaluation	of	artworks,	for	example	in	the	case	of	formalism.		Given	the	way	he	has	characterized	aesthetically	relevant	properties,	I	think	they	cannot	play	this	role.				The	core	problem	comes	from	the	unconstrained	way	that	Nanay	has	introduced	the	notion	of	making	an	aesthetic	difference,	allowing	our	idiosyncrasies	to	easily	make	a	property	aesthetically	relevant.		For	example,	if	you	are	a	consistent	and	committed	formalist,	you	might	be	such	that	only	formal	properties	make	an	aesthetic	difference	for	you.		But	if	you	are	a	consistent	and	committed	opponent	of	formalism,	you	might	be	such	that	not	only	formal	properties	make	an	aesthetic	difference	for	you.		It	is	uncontroversial	true	that	non-formal	properties	make	an	aesthetic	difference	for	someone,	and	so	are	aesthetically	relevant	in	the	suggested	sense,	but	that	shouldn't	be	enough	to	refute	formalism	right	away.		There	is	room	for	a	substantive	debate	about	whether	only	formal	properties	matter	for	aesthetic	evaluation,	I	just	don't	see	how	we	can	usefully	constrain	that	debate	with	Nanay's	notion	of	aesthetically	relevant	properties.		
	To	see	the	problem	in	a	different	context,	consider	debates	about	potential	interactions	between	moral	appraisal	and	aesthetic	evaluation.		For	some	audiences,	attending	to	Roman	Polanski's	moral	or	immoral	properties	make	an	enormous	difference	to	the	valence	of	their	experiences	of	his	films,	and	so	supply	aesthetically	relevant	properties	in	spades.		But	that	is	not	enough	to	settle	the	question	of	whether	moral	considerations	ever	matter	for	aesthetic	evaluation.				At	a	minimum,	if	Nanay	is	to	reconfigure	debates	about	aesthetic	evaluation	in	terms	of	aesthetically	relevant	properties,	he	presumably	should	use	some	normative	variant	of	the	notion	in	terms	of	what	should	make	or	may	make	or	appropriately	makes	an	aesthetic	difference.		But	I	am	not	yet	clear	on	how	exactly	to	reconfigure	classic	debates	in	those	terms,	nor	on	what	we	will	gain	if	we	do	so.		
2.	Aesthetics	and	Cognitive	Penetration		I'll	now	zoom	out	to	Nanay's	overarching	theme	of	interconnections	between	aesthetics	and	the	philosophy	of	perception.		I'll	start	with	the	cognitive	penetrability	of	perception,	where	your	perception	is	somehow	importantly	shaped	by	your	expectations	or	other	cognitive	states	(more	soon	on	exactly	how).				According	to	Nanay,	claims	about	the	cognitive	penetrability	of	perception	have	many	ramifications	for	aesthetics.		In	particular,	he	thinks	that	they	destroy	a	Ruskin-style	“myth	of	the	innocent	eye”	(131-133).		I	think	this	more	specific	claim	is	importantly	wrong.		First,	we	need	to	hear	more	about	what	sort	of	cognitive	penetrability	of	perception	Nanay	needs	for	his	theoretical	purposes.		He	says	he	can	get	by	with	the	weak	claim	that	“our	visual	experience	is	subject	to	top-down	attentional	influences	(133).”		But	I	don't	think	this	claim	gives	us	enough	to	destroy	the	myth	of	the	innocent	eye.		To	see	why,	here’s	Ruskin:		
The whole technical power of painting depends on our recovery of what may be 
called the innocence of the eye; ... a sort of childish perception of these flat stains of 
colour ... without consciousness of what they signify... (1857: 22).		As	far	as	I	can	tell	from	this	passage,	Ruskin	could	accept	that	vision	can	be	affected	by	top-down	attentional	influence,	where	non-innocent	perception	might	involve	all	too	much	top-down	attention.		He	could	also	invoke	our	top-down	attention	as	a	means	to	recover	innocent	perception.		For	example,	when	he	discusses	looking	at	grass,	and	writes	that	"to	[the	accomplished	artist]	it	does	not	seem	shade	and	light,	but	bluish	green	barred	with	gold	(1857:	23)",	perhaps	the	artist	pulls	this	off	by	deliberately	attending	to	patches	of	color	on	grass	without	attending	to	how	the	grass	is	illuminated.		So	Nanay's	minimal	construal	of	the	cognitive	penetrability	of	perception	needn't	conflict	with	the	idea	of	the	innocent	eye,	in	fact	our	recovery	of	the	innocent	eye	might	require	the	intervention	of	our	(top-down)	attention.					
	Nanay	also	claims	that	the	myth	of	the	innocent	eye	is	refuted	by	a	broader	range	of	psychological	experiments,	according	to	which	a	heart-shaped	cut-out	looks	redder	because	of	our	prior	information	about	hearts,	or	a	picture	of	a	banana	looks	yellower	because	of	our	prior	information	about	bananas.		Here	again	the	idea	of	the	innocent	eye	does	not	have	to	conflict	with	these	experiments,	and	might	even	require	that	perception	is	cognitively	penetrable	in	the	experiments'	sense.		Theorists	like	Ruskin	could	acknowledge	the	existence	of	perception	that	is	cognitively	infused,	thanking	Nanay	for	pointing	out	some	of	the	ways	in	which	our	current	perception	fails	to	be	innocent.		They	would	then	ask	us	to	regain	perception	that	in	some	way	brackets	our	prior	knowledge	and	expectations.		Since	any	such	"innocent	perception"	can	itself	be	lost,	they	could	even	allow	that	all	perception	is	cognitively	penetrable.		And	since	the	"innocent"	perception	recovered	is	recovered	as	a	result	of	desire,	cognitive	effort	(and	again	potentially	attention),	they	might	allow	an	important	sense	in	which	the	"innocent"	perception	recovered	is	itself	cognitively	shaped.		It	may	or	may	not	be	possible	to	succeed	in	their	project	of	recovery,	but	that	question	is	not	directly	addressed	by	the	experiments	mentioned	by	Nanay,	and	it	is	not	yet	clear	how	to	extrapolate	an	indirect	answer.			I	do	agree	that	the	cognitive	penetrability	of	perception	matters	for	aesthetics,	I	actually	think	that	Nanay	has	overlooked	some	of	its	potential	implications,	and	now	will	examine	one	of	them.				Consider	when	Nanay	addresses	puzzling	pairs	such	as	Duchamp’s	Fountain	and	corresponding	non-art	urinals,	or	pairs	of	fakes	and	corresponding	originals,	and	writes	that	“as	indistinguishable	objects	[they]	share	all	their	observable	properties	by	definition	(109)”.		Or	when	he	discusses	Danto’s	Gallery	of	Indiscernibles	involving	many	paintings	of	the	same	shade	and	size	with	different	titles,	and	writes	that	“while	the	observable	properties	of	all	these	artworks	are	the	same,	their	‘meaning’	and	aesthetic	value	can	be	very	different’	(120)."		On	the	tempting	line	of	thought	Nanay	takes	up,	the	puzzling	pairs	consist	of	two	objects	that	have	the	same	observable	properties,	yet	differ	in	their	aesthetic	properties.		The	pairs	are	thereby	supposed	to	serve	as	counterexamples	to	the	view	that	sameness	of	observable	properties	entails	sameness	of	aesthetic	properties.				Once	you’re	on	board	with	the	possibility	of	cognitive	penetration,	you	should	be	more	careful	about	this	line	of	thought.		For	example,	the	cognitive	penetrability	of	perception,	and	your	background	knowledge	about	art,	might	result	in	your	perceiving	Fountain	as	wry,	or	a	version	of	The	Card	Players	as	being	painted	by	Cezanne.		(This	is	not	to	say	that	cognitive	penetration	is	the	only	way	to	end	up	being	able	to	perceive	such	properties,	just	that	it	is	a	plausible	route	to	such	an	outcome).		Now	the	property	of	being	painted	by	Cezanne	would	be	an	observable	property,	one	that	fails	to	be	had	by	any	fakes	not	painted	by	Cezanne.		The	puzzling	pairs	we	started	out	with	would	fail	to	have	the	same	observable	properties	after	all,	and	we	would	now	still	have	space	for	the	view	that	any	two	works	with	the	same	observable	properties	have	the	same	aesthetic	properties.				
	In	sum,	Nanay	is	wrong	to	think	that	the	cognitively	penetrability	of	perception	rules	out	the	myth	of	the	innocent	eye.		But	he	is	absolutely	right	that	it	matters	for	central	debates	in	aesthetics,	as	it	does	for	the	debate	about	whether	aesthetic	differences	between	works	could	still	exist	when	the	works	are	the	same	with	respect	to	their	observable	properties.				I'll	now	close	with	a	more	general	observation	about	Nanay's	approach.	Throughout	the	book,	he	works	with	the	notion	of	experience,	even	defining	the	scope	of	aesthetics	in	its	terms	(6).	He	also	almost	never	discusses	unconscious	perception	or	unconscious	attention	(although	he	discusses	them	extensively	in	other	work).		To	exaggerate	a	bit,	he	could	have	called	his	book	Aesthetics	as	Consciousness	Studies	rather	than	Aesthetics	as	Philosophy	of	Perception.						Assuming	that	there	are	such	mental	states	as	unconscious	perception	and	unconscious	attention,	as	is	widely	maintained	in	psychology	and	the	philosophy	of	perception,	why	not	broaden	the	scope	of	the	discussion	to	unconscious	mental	states?		What	justifies	the	experience-first	approach	used	in	the	book?		If	we	are	to	take	the	philosophy	of	perception	seriously	when	doing	aesthetics,	we	should	take	the	possibility	of	unconscious	perception	and	unconscious	attention	seriously	as	well.		For	example,	when	we	consider	whether	the	observable	properties	of	a	work	fix	its	aesthetic	properties,	we	might	benefit	from	considering	versions	of	the	thesis	that	include	or	exclude	unconsciously	observable	properties	of	a	work.		Perhaps	the	consciously	perceivable	properties	of	a	work	do	not	always	fix	its	aesthetic	properties,	but	a	work’s	overall	perceivable	properties	do	fix	its	aesthetic	properties	once	we	include	the	work’s	unconsciously	perceivable	properties.						When	Nanay	preaches	that	aesthetics	will	benefit	from	deeper	engagement	with	the	philosophy	of	perception,	I	applaud.		Given	his	neglect	of	unconscious	perception	and	attention,	I	just	think	that	he	(and	the	rest	of	us)	have	a	lot	of	work	left	to	do.							
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